Behavioural influences on attitudes towards petty corruption
A Study of Social Norms, Automatic Thinking and Mental Models in Rwanda

Claudia Baez-Camargo, Tharcisse Gatwa, Abel Dufitumukiza, Cosimo Stahl, Saba Kassa

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Dr Claudia Baez-Camargo, University of Basel, Basel Institute on Governance, Steinenring 60, 4051 Basel, Switzerland, claudia.baez-camargo@baselgovernance.org

Dr Tharcisse Gatwa, The Protestant Institute of Arts and Social Sciences, Butare, Rwanda, tharcissegatwa@hotmail.com

Mr Abel Dufitumukiza, The Protestant Institute of Arts and Social Sciences, Butare, Rwanda, dufitumukizaa26@gmail.com

Mr Cosimo Stahl, Basel Institute on Governance, Steinenring 60, 4051 Basel, Switzerland, cosimo.stahl@baselgovernance.org

Dr Saba Kassa, Basel Institute on Governance, Steinenring 60, 4051 Basel, Switzerland, saba.kassa@baselgovernance.org

Table of contents

Acronyms

CPI	Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International)
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
EARF	East Africa Research Fund (DFID)
EARH	East Africa Research Hub (DFID)
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HGS/HGI	Home-grown solutions/initiatives
RNP	Rwanda National Police
RWF	Rwandan Franc
TI	Transparency International
WDR	2015 World Development Report (World Bank)

1 Introduction

Although substantial investments and efforts have been made to combat corruption in the developing world, the effects of conventional anti-corruption interventions remain modest at best (Marquette and Pfeiffer 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi 2011). This is often reflected in the so-called implementation gap whereby countries continue to perform rather badly despite having adopted legal and institutional reforms based on anti-corruption best practices (ibid.). As a consequence, there is growing criticism aimed at the seeming impotence of purely legal, institutional interventions focussing on corruption opportunities, incentives and risks, because they often fail to adequately take into account the local context (Haruna 2003; Mette Kjaer 2004; Ruhumyamiheto 2004), including prevailing social incentives, expectations and understandings vis-à-vis corruption (Baez-Camargo and Passas 2017).

As some authors have argued, corruption may be fuelled by large-scale collective action and coordination problems whereby an individual's decision to behave corruptly hinges upon their perception of their close environment as being highly corrupt (Marquette and Pfeiffer 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi 2011; Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013). Furthermore, corruption may not necessarily constitute a problem per se but can actually offer pragmatic solutions to ordinary citizens as means of 'getting things done' (ibid.), while at the level of political and business elites, corruption may fulfil informal governance functions critical for regime stability and survival (Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 2017).

Research has only very recently begun to reveal how corrupt practices are perceived in the eyes of those directly engaging in them. Emerging evidence suggests that corruption is often seen as either a 'necessary evil' or simply 'the way things are done', suggesting a high degree of social acceptability of corruption in local contexts where corrupt collective practices have become normalised (Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel 2017). In some cases not adapting to certain normalised behaviours linked to corruption may bear high social costs when community expectations are not fulfilled. In other cases, mentally engrained collective imaginaries associated to culture or local folklore may reinforce practices associated with corruption. Therefore, when certain types of corrupt actions are socially embedded or culturally rooted, it can be said that they have become a feature during the enculturation of individuals, and thereby become collectively reproduced, normalised and reinforced (cf. Hoff and Stiglitz, 2015).

The above considerations suggest that there is a crucial need to rethink the formulation of anti-corruption approaches in order to account for locally prevailing conditions and context-specific drivers of corruption – including hidden agendas, social habits and deeply engrained attitudes towards corruption (Baez-Camargo and Passas 2017; Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel 2017). This calls for more nuanced complementary approaches that incorporate a contextualised understanding of *behavioural drivers* of corruption.

Against this backdrop, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), through its East Africa Research Fund (EARF), commissioned the Basel Institute on Governance to conduct the research project "Corruption, Social Norms and Behaviours in East Africa" (hereafter "the Project") aiming at shedding light into those "[behavioural] factors that influence the propensity for poor people to engage in, resist and report 'corrupt transactions'" in three East African countries, namely Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.[1] The Project activities were undertaken in collaboration with researchers from the

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[1] Terms of Reference, Research on Corruption Social Norms and Behaviours in East Africa, published on 9 October 2015 by EARF (DFID).

Protestant University of Rwanda and took place between January 2016 and August 2017. The Project implementation involved two major components.

The first component was a semi-systematic literature review (hereafter "the Literature Review") (Stahl, Kassa, and Baez-Camargo 2017) and an accompanying Policy Brief (Baez-Camargo 2017) that compiled the evidence about the mechanisms whereby behavioural factors affect decision making related to practices of petty corruption and assessed the relative effectiveness of anti-corruption interventions targeting petty corruption in developing countries.[2]

The second component comprised field research activities exploring the commonalities and differences in behavioural influences on attitudes towards petty corruption across the three case study countries, focusing on the interactions between ordinary citizens and low-to-mid level officials.[3] The field research findings have been integrated into three country reports with accompanying policy briefs and a synthesis comparative assessment distilling the implications of the research findings for anti-corruption practice and corruption research.[4]

This report presents the main findings from the field research activities for the case of Rwanda, which focused on the health and police sectors. The report is organised as follows: following this introduction, Section 2 presents the research design, including the research rationale, the underlying conceptual framework, applied methods as well as limitations. Section 3 provides a general background of the Rwandan context in terms of the experience in implementing anti-corruption policies and strategies and its relevance as a case study for the East Africa region. The main research findings are presented subsequently: Section 4 presents the main modalities of petty corruption practices in the health and police sectors that were identified in the course of the research activities. Section 5 discusses the findings associated with the impact of factors of sociality on attitudes towards petty corruption in the Rwandan context. Section 6 is devoted to describing the findings related to how environmental heuristics and shared mental models shape the manner in which individuals make decisions on whether to engage in or abstain from acts of petty corruption. Section 7 elaborates conclusions on the relevance of behavioural factors for understanding petty corruption outcomes in Rwanda and discusses policy recommendations.

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[2] Both documents are accessible on https://www.baselgovernance.org/publications/3623 and https://www.baselgovernance.org/publications/3621 respectively.

[3] A complementary research project, entitled 'Informal Governance and Corruption – Transcending the Principal-Agent and Collective Action Paradigms', has been commissioned by DFID and the British Academy (BA) and implemented by the Basel Institute on Governance in collaboration with University College London (UCL) and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). Following an inductive approach – it looks at those norms and practices commonly employed by political and business elites. This top-down perspective seeks to uncover unwritten rules and behavioural patterns that articulate informal governance regimes associated with high prevalence of corruption. More information can be found on: www.britac.ac.uk/anti-corruption, www.britac.ac.uk/node/4660.

[4] All documents are accessible on: https://www.baselgovernance.org/publications.

2 Research Design

2.1 Rationale and conceptual approach

A major contribution of this research is the advancement of anti-corruption practice and corruption research by investigating the prevalence and impact of behavioural drivers of corruption. Behavioural drivers comprise quasi-rational and non-rational factors that are conducive to unfavourable corruption outcomes, including collective ways of thinking, mental shortcuts and cues, and socio-cultural expectations. In contrast, non-behavioural drivers of corruption are based on rational assumptions of human behaviour and include economic, political, institutional and organisational factors. The presumption is that *behavioural insights* can be used to shape innovative anti-corruption policies to complement mainstream approaches (cf. Dolan et al. 2010, 8).[5]

As per the Terms of Reference for the Project, the conceptual approach that was adopted follows the *three* broad principles of human decision-making identified in the 2015 World Development Report (WDR) on 'Mind, Society and Behaviour':

- 'Thinking automatically' refers to the propensity of people to make most judgments and choices automatically, rather than deliberatively. Individuals typically process imperfect information by resorting to shortcuts and reach decisions in response to *frames* (the way choices are presented), *anchors* (contextual aspects without direct relevance to a decision which nonetheless lead individuals to jump to conclusions and make rash decisions) or *default options* (modal patterns of behaviour prevailing in a given social context).

- 'Thinking socially' recognises that people are enculturated into acting and thinking collectively.[6] Thus, social values, preferences, norms, identities and networks can exert a decisive influence on decision-making because people care about their surroundings and strive to align to what is perceived to be socially acceptable. Social determinants of individual choice often revolve around issues concerning status, respect, shame, and guilt.

- 'Thinking with mental models' means that individuals in any given society share common perspectives and ideas through which they make sense of the world around them. In other words, decision-making relies on concepts, categories, identities, prototypes, stereotypes causal narratives and worldviews drawn from one's environment. Mental models can refer to the macro level, where individuals share a collective vision of how things work around them, which might be shaped by factors such as history, ideology, religion and exposure to different types of institutions. Mental models can also apply to the micro level, where an individual's self-concept may consist of multiple identities, each associated with different norms that dictate adequate behaviours for different situations.

In terms of definitions and operationalisation of key concepts, a first recognition is that petty corruption is a highly multifaceted and fluid concept, which may comprise many different practices depending on the context. As such, it may not easily be captured in a definition or formula (Ledeneva, Bratu, and

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[5] Behavioural insights aim to improve development outcomes through a new generation of policies that are empirically grounded and ideally experimentally tested. According to the OECD, 'behavioural insights' is one discipline in a family of three, the others being behavioural science and behavioural economics – that, in addition to traditional economic strategies, use insights from psychology, cognitive science and other social science disciplines to unveil the workings of non-rational drivers of human behaviour. More information can be found on: www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/behavioural-insights.htm [1 August 2017]
[6] Enculturation refers to processes whereby individuals learn and internalise their group's culture and social norms through repeated exposure, observation and experience, mostly during primary and secondary socialisation (Hoff and Stiglitz 2015; Gavelek and Kong 2012).

Köker 2017; Torsello 2011). For this reason, and because the research specifically seeks to shed light on behavioural factors impacting attitudes towards petty corruption, a broad approach to studying petty corruption has been deemed most appropriate in order to capture the various manners in which individuals understand petty corruption and the practices associated with it in their local contexts.

Therefore, the research focused on informal transactions (i.e. those that do not adhere to formal processes and rules) involving low to mid-level officials and ordinary citizens. Embracing a broad view was important in order to be able to capture the range of practices that have social and context-specific grounding and that blur the lines between what is appropriate and inappropriate behaviours in the interactions between citizens and public officials, particularly providers of public services.

On the basis of this broad approach, practices of petty corruption were identified following Transparency International which defines petty corruption as the 'everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and mid-level public officials in their interaction with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies' (Transparency International 2009). Thus, the definition utilised captures practices such as bribery and favouritism in the different forms they may take. It also captures what the World Bank (2010, p. 2) has labelled 'quiet corruption' – forms of petty corruption and malpractices of frontline providers (such as teachers, health service providers and public officials) that are "difficult to observe and quantify [...], do not involve monetary exchange [...], but whose impact on service delivery and regulation has adverse long-term effects on households." In the developing world, it is primarily through corruption that the provision of basic services is disrupted, thereby affecting the poor and vulnerable the most (DFID 2015).

2.2 Research design and methods

The Project employed a comparative case study approach applied in six regions across the three case study countries, with research activities in two regions per country (one urban and one rural area) as follows:

- Urban areas: Kigali (Rwanda), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Kampala (Uganda)
- Rural areas: Southern Province (Gisagara district) (Rwanda), Kagera region (Tanzania), and Northern Uganda (Acholi subregion) (Uganda)

For each country, two public service sectors of key relevance were selected in consultation with DFID experts and local stakeholders, namely, the health and education sectors in Uganda and Tanzania and the police and health sectors in Rwanda.

The methodology consisted of a sequential mixed-methods design comprising focus group discussions (FGDs), a vignette-based survey and participant observation. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted to complement some of the research findings with the perspectives of the responsible authorities.

The choice of a qualitative methodology is grounded in the fact that, as the Literature Review revealed, the Project represents a pioneering study being one of the first efforts to collect empirical data establishing the links between behavioural influences and corruption.[7] The choice is also justifiable by

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[7] To our knowledge Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel, (2017) for the case of Nigeria and the on-going project "Corruption in the Criminal Justice Sector" of the Fletcher School at Tufts University [http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Institute-for-Human-Security/Research/Corruption] for the cases of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are the only studies to have explicitly taken this approach to date.

the primary aim of this research to accurately capture the aforementioned hidden, clandestine and covert forms of petty and 'quiet' corruption (cf. World Bank 2010). In this regard, the research activities, although guided by the findings from the Literature Review, were to a large extent exploratory given the scarcity of empirical evidence and analysis. Although an effort was made to quantify some of the findings through the implementation of a survey, given sampling and resource constraints the survey is meant to yield insights indicative of prevailing patterns and does not represent statistically significant national-level trends. Therefore, data analysis of the survey remained qualitative in nature. For both the FGDs and the survey a purposive sampling strategy was employed in order to maintain the focus narrowly aimed at the prospective beneficiaries of anti-corruption interventions.

2.2.1 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

Two categories of FGDs were convened in each of the two research areas:

- Citizens/users
- Service providers: teachers and nurses

The following are the backgrounds of the FGD participants in both areas:

Rural Gisagara District

Service seekers:

- Motorists and drivers
- Mothers with child(ren) under the age of five
- Community healthcare volunteer *(abajyanama b'ubuzima)*
- Business people (small trade), a representative of citizens that are physically challenged, youth (educated and non-educated), a member of a women's association, elderly and a member of a traditional court *(abunzi)*

Service providers:

- Nurses in public healthcare facilities
- Workers in Isange One Stop Centre (rehabilitation centre run by police)
- Lawyer who worked with one public hospital

Urban Gikondo District (Kigali)

Service seekers:

- Drivers
- Women
- Representative of youth
- Elderly
- Member of community councils

Service providers:

- Nurses in public healthcare facilities and teaching hospital

- Lawyer

The FGDs followed a protocol of prioritised topics relevant for the research and validated by the Project's expert advisory group, testing for the prevalence of petty corrupt practices, as well as for the most relevant concepts appearing in the literature. The findings from the FGDs were subsequently used to revise and refine the survey instrument.

2.2.2 Vignette-based survey

The second research instrument is a vignette-based survey consisting of two components. In the first section, basic demographic information was gathered and respondents were probed on a variety of topics including prevalence of corruption in the chosen sectors, level of trust towards different public, political and social institutions, and prevalence of certain social norms and values in the respective communities.

In the second section, fourteen 'survey vignettes' were developed in order to focus the inquiry into the key topics that were uncovered in the FGDs. [8] One of the main goals of the survey was to try to tease out whether there are differences in attitudes toward corruption depending on its intended outcome. Each 'vignette' describes a scenario or an instance representing one of four distinct types of corrupt practices, namely:

- 'Greasing the system': expediting access to a service or resource one is entitled to
- Obtaining access to a service or resource one is not entitled to
- Avoiding a sanction
- Personal enrichment

In the vignettes, a distinction was made on whether a corrupt action responds to the expectations and obligations associated with informal social networks. Survey respondents were divided into two groups: In the first group, the respondents were asked to rate the degree to which the action in question is of a corrupt nature. Ratings were made on a scale from 0 to 5 where 0 is not corrupt and 5 is maximum corruption. In the second group, the respondents were asked to rate the likelihood that they would engage in such behaviour. Ratings were made on a scale from 0 to 5 where 0 means "I would never do it" and 5 means "I would certainly do it". These two modalities probe for what respondents believe is morally right or wrong and for what they would actually consider being involved in (on a more pragmatic basis). This distinction is relevant given the emerging insights into the ambivalent distinction between what is deemed to be correct and what is accepted as necessary in one's own context.

A total of 596 surveys were conducted across the three countries of which 204 were applied in Uganda (100 in the Gulu District and 104 in Kampala), 200 were applied in Tanzania (100 in Kagera region and 100 in Dar es Salaam) and 192 were applied in Rwanda (94 in Gisagara district and 98 in Kigali).

The purposive sample design included low income and middle class individuals in their 20s and 30s (to capture women in child-bearing age and parents of children attending public schools), elderly, and public sector workers.

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[8] This methodological vignette approach has been developed and tested by Sautu and colleagues (Sautu 2009, 2004, 2002) who developed a corruption tolerance index studying the propensity of the Buenos Aires middle-class to engage in corruption.

2.2.3 Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with management level actors in the two case study sectors as well as with individuals with experiences particularly befitting of the research focus areas as described below:

- Officer in charge of social affairs and notary and legal service at sector level
- Head nurse in healthcare facility
- Officers from the Rwanda Biomedical Center
- Former officers of the Ministry of Health
- Police officers
- Officers of anti-corruption agencies
- Representative of transport agencies
- Participants involved in facilitating driving licence exams

2.2.4 Limitations

As has been mentioned earlier, it is important to underscore the pioneering nature of this research. As such, the research activities must be considered as exploratory and constituting a first step towards compiling empirical evidence on the nature of prevailing behavioural influences on the attitudes towards petty corruption among citizens in the three countries. Thus, the research findings seek to shed light on broad patterns characterising behaviours, choices, incentives, beliefs and understandings of citizens that impact prevailing levels of petty corruption in the sectors studied. The limited sample sizes also signify that the findings are indicative and at best representative of the communities in which the research activities took place and are in no way statistically generalisable to the entire national context. Rather, the primary aim is to account for analytical generalisation (cf. Yin 1998, 2014) by cross-comparing the results from the three case studies through a behavioural lens as stipulated by the conceptual framework (WDR). In order to validate the findings of the research, efforts have been made to corroborate the trends captured in the research with results from major surveys conducted at the national level such as the East Africa Bribery Index 2017. However, while the research suggests that informal practices (such as favouritism and gift-giving) have a central role in shaping outcomes in the provision of public services, many of the behaviours documented have not been to date properly quantified by means of national level representative surveys. In this regard, the research findings should be interpreted as the output of a first-phase exploratory inquiry that draws the attention of practitioners to certain social dynamics and points to topics in need for further research.

3 Rwanda: Background

Since the genocide in 1994, Rwanda has been praised for its development model through which formidable changes have been achieved. The Rwandan government under Paul Kagame's leadership has managed to sustain economic growth, reduce poverty, improve political stability and tackle corruption. Among international donors and anti-corruption practitioners, Rwanda is considered one of the African success stories and a potential role model to other countries (Crisafulli and Redmond 2012).

The key driver of these remarkable improvements is to be found in Rwanda's governance model based on authority, leadership and decision-making. This model is notorious for strictly enforcing the rule of law, its high degree of organisational efficiency, its praised resource management capacity, as well as the effective delivery of public services and, of course, the control of corruption (Bozzini 2014; Golooba-Mutebi and Booth 2013).

The Rwandan government has made the fight against corruption one of its top national priorities by ensuring that adequate anti-corruption legal frameworks and monitoring institutions are in place. It has formalised a 'zero-tolerance' approach to corruption based on harsh punishments and strict law enforcement, while at the same time sensitising the public about the value of anti-corruption and integrity.[9] Owing to the Government's strong commitment and political will to curb corruption, Rwanda is now among the least corrupt countries in Africa. In 2016, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranked Rwanda in 50th position (with an overall score of 54) – becoming the third best performer in Africa (together with Mauritius) only after Botswana (at 35th position) and Cape Verde (at 38th position). Similarly, according to the 2016 Wold Bank's Worldwide Governance indicators, Rwanda scored very high values (of 75) for the 'control of corruption' indicator.

However, while some hail the country as a star performer and a model for the developing world, other sources have been more critical suggesting that Rwanda's performance is weak on indicators of voice and accountability, transparency and civil society engagement (Bozzini 2014).[10] There are also claims that accountability enacting institutions, such as the media, civil society, parliament and the judiciary only play a secondary role in the fight of corruption (ibid.).

The Rwandan government staunchly rejects such criticisms pointing to concrete counter examples to those claims. For instance, there are plenty mechanisms of accountability in place across the Rwandan public administration that incorporate significant checks and balances on the actions of the regime. A salient example is the report of the Auditor General, which is delivered on an annual basis to the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament and broadcasted live.[11] Other mechanisms of accountability and

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[9] Key legislations set in place include the law (no 23/2003) on prevention and repression of corruption and related offences and penal codes article 220-227 and 633-651. Article 633 of the penal code defines corruption as "any act of abuse of a position, power or honour one enjoys within a state organ, in a public or private institution, in a foreign company or international organization working in the country, or power conferred by any other function which is used contrary to the law, by giving to oneself, giving to others or requiring an illegal benefit or a service contrary to the law". A Whistleblower Protection Law (no 35/2012) was passed in 2012. Anti-corruption institutions include the Office of the Ombudsmen, the Rwanda Public Procurement Authority, the Office of the Auditor General, the Rwanda Revenue Authority's anti-corruption unit and the Public Procurement Appeals Commission. The Office of the Ombudsmen has launched sensitisation and awareness-raising campaigns to prime the public about anti-corruption and integrity and organises a yearly anti-corruption week (Gatwa 2017; Bozzini 2014). Other anti-corruption campaigns are regularly undertaken within the Judiciary system [Supreme Court, Courts and Tribunals]; the Rwanda National Police; by the Ministry of Home Affairs and Local Government and the Ministry of Labour as well as in the media.
[10] Examples of the sources referenced by this author are: the World Bank Country Performance and Institutional Assessment, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the Mo Ibrahim Index and the African Development Bank Country Performance Rating.
[11] The Auditor General of Rwanda emphasised in an interview with two of the researchers the seriousness with which the duty of accountability of his office to Parliament is taken: "I can delay the report one hour but not a day."

transparency at national and local levels include the annual evaluation of the achievements of national development projects (*Imihigo)* both at the district and national levels, the National Leadership Retreat, and the National Dialogue.

Controversies aside, it is clear that Rwanda outperforms other countries in the region in containing petty corruption in its public sector. Therefore, Rwanda represents a crucial case demanding careful study of the diverse factors that underpin that success, including the strengths and shortcomings of the approaches employed by the government authorities but also the social determinants that would reinforce state policies from the bottom-up. In particular, the Rwandan case raises important questions within the scope of the Project. For instance, has the Rwandan regime incorporated behavioural elements into its anti-corruption strategies? Do social norms and values, and shared mental models and other contextual features particular to Rwanda inherently promote better anti-corruption results? Have sociocultural attributes been reshaped as a result of a stronger enforcement of the rule of law? The present report aims to provide insights conducive to responding to these questions.

4 Characterising petty corruption and its modalities

On the basis of the research findings, this section points to the different behaviours and practices associated to petty corruption that are said to be recurrent in the Rwandan health sector and the police and law enforcement, reflecting also on their prevalence and the enabling circumstances in which they take place. Due note is also taken of the countervailing mechanisms and circumstances that work in preventing corruption from occurring in the provision of public services in Rwanda.

4.1 Corruption in the interactions between service providers and users in the health sector

A key aspect of public service delivery concerns the manner in which citizens can access public goods and services. In particular in relation to accessing public health services, the FGD findings suggest that urban users normally feel that they are "well treated, received and respected".[12] According to the generalised experiences among research participants, services are provided as mandated by the rules and regulations governing the public provision of health services in Rwanda. These rules and regulations emanate from *Ubudehe*, which is a poverty reduction initiative and one of the country's core development programmes. *Ubudehe* involves a system of categorisation of all households according to income level, which forms the basis to determine entitlements and for the allocation of subsidies. The national health system requires that all citizens submit themselves to the *ubudehe* categorisation, in which service users are divided into four categories: category 1 corresponds to the poorest households whose members enjoy unlimited access to public health services provided free of charge. *Ubudehe* categories 2, 3 and 4 comprise more affluent citizens who are required to contribute a co-payment commensurate to their income level when accessing public health services.[13] Community councils are (usually) responsible for the implementation of the *Ubudehe* categorisation process and for ensuring that citizens receive government-issued health insurance cards, which are essential for accessing health care services.[14]

Citizens and service providers participating in the study also widely shared the expectation that deviation from the formal rules in the provision of health services, including acts of corruption, involve significant risks of detection and punishment. Indeed, the research findings suggest that the potential of deviant behaviours being exposed and the harsh legal repercussions that may follow act as powerful deterrent. The importance of behaving according to the law resonates with the survey results in which a majority of respondents most closely self-identified with vignettes of individuals characterised as law abiding.[15]

Consequently, the experiences shared within the FGDs indicate that service providers typically apply the correct co-payment rates when treating service seekers who are in possession of valid health

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[12] This positive evaluation was not equally embraced by all research participants as a participant from the rural area complained that "they [the health workers] do not respect us. [...] Surprisingly, when we go to hospitals or health centres in the city [Butare-Huye] or to private centres, we are well received and respected." As the second part of the comment suggests, the account given is indicative of local variation in standards of health care provision rather than systematic difference in the standard of care between urban and rural facilities since the FGD participants from the latter area, while unanimous about the poor service in their health centre, also confirmed that treatment is appropriate when they seek health service in neighbouring Sectors (as well as at the Kabutare health centre in Butare).

[13] Citizens belonging to categories 2 and 3 usually pay 3000 RWF per person annually to be enrolled and receive medical treatment with a subsequent 10% co-pay for treatment incurred, whereas individuals in category 4 are liable to pay 7000 RWF per person annually also with a 10% co-pay.

[14] Service seekers lacking health insurance cards must cover the full costs of the health services obtained.

[15] 34% of survey respondents identified a law-abiding character as being 'like me' while 32% said such character would be 'very much like me'.

insurance cards and that patients receive adequate treatment in an equitable manner. This in turn results in a positive evaluation of the quality and accessibility of health services. Indeed, research participants agree that users do not face any major challenges nor need to result to informal strategies to receive the services they are entitled to. This perception is further echoed by the high percentage (43%) of survey respondents who reported having 'high levels of trust' in the health services provided in Rwanda.

Within this context of strict enforcement of the rule of law, research participants nonetheless identified four types of practices involving petty corruption that still take place in the Rwandan health sector:

a) bribing during the health insurance card registration process,
b) favouritism in the service provision (particularly in the rural areas probed),
c) gift-giving
d) bribery (more prevalent in the urban setting).

Research participants noted that unsolicited bribery can take place during the *ubudehe* categorisation process. Since category 1 insurance card holders are eligible for free health services, more affluent individuals in the rural area have been known to offer bribes to be assigned to that category. Urban focus group discussants in Kigali also reported instances where council officials solicit a small facilitation payment in cases where the applicants' documentation has been incomplete, incorrect, or when the application processing or the issuance of the health insurance card have been delayed. For instance, one female participant recalled an experience involving the medical treatment of a child at King Faysal hospital that resulted in treatment costs of over 7 million Rwandan Franc (RWF). Although the health insurance card for the child had been paid, it had nevertheless not been activated in time. In view of that situation, the family then paid *akantu* [something] for the card to be antedated. Another participant shared a similar experience: "there is a lot of bribery and corruption in local offices of *Mutuelle de Santé* […], it happened to me [that] my household employee felt ill on the weekend but his health insurance card was not yet enacted. Therefore I paid *akantu* [something] and his card was enacted with anticipated date." Urban FGD participants agreed that, although these kinds of corrupt incidences during *Ubudehe* registration were widespread, they were also being addressed through increased monitoring and by the digitisation of the registration process.

A second type of corrupt practice that research participants identified as occurring in the health sector involved favouritism, which was said to persist partly due to the influence of family traditions and values prevailing in Rwandan society. While favouritism could be regarded as less detrimental compared to other corrupt practices, it is still a form of quiet and moral corruption that can compromise the effectiveness of service delivery and lead to distress among service users. In the research data, favouritism came up as a problem more frequently in the rural as compared to the urban areas, perhaps reflecting the smaller community sizes and a higher intensity in the social contacts among community members.

Favouritism was said to affect practices of recruitment when council and government officials resort to hiring friends and family members instead of those who performed better in employment tests. FGD participants from the rural area also related encountering instances of favouritism when preferential (faster) treatment is given to the family and friends of service providers. Although every service seeker holding a valid insurance card will get treated, there was a perception that those lacking social connections may face longer waiting times and be treated less courteously. However, it was also acknowledged that health workers do prioritise service according to need as noted by one research participant, who stated that preferential treatment is often given to the most needy, such as "the case of an old person, a pregnant woman or a person with disability […], and people find it normal."

A third informal practice occurring in the context of health service provision is unsolicited gift-giving on the part of service users. Like in many other African countries, gift-giving is a deeply embedded social practice in Rwanda and is an inherent part of local culture and customs. As such, it is deeply engrained in the minds of people and practised widely. However, the challenging quality of gift-giving emerges if it is understood to solicit a reciprocal gesture in return; that is, when the gift generates perceptions of indebtedness on the part of the recipient and of entitlement on the part of the giver. In this regard, a nurse in the urban FGD shared her own experience with the practice of gift-giving – when after providing treatment diligently to a woman – the patient's husband came into her office, handed her a bag of rice and left before the nurse had time to comment. The unspoken meaning of the gift was revealed some days later, when the husband called to request that the nurse help his sister-in-law who was in labour.

Furthermore, one has to account for local meanings and symbolisms in order to appreciate the ambivalent nature of a gift. For instance, in Rwanda, the most generous and obeisant of gifts is traditionally a cow. A rural service user tells the story of how her father gifted a cow to their family doctor as a token of true appreciation after he had treated his sick child. After this very generous one-time gift, the doctor gave privileged treatment to the family, even receiving them in his private residence to provide medical care and advice. Thus, although in principle aligned with practices of sociality, gift-giving is problematic in the context of public service provision because it can create a personal bond between providers and users at the expense of non-gift givers and therefore constitutes a challenge to equitable service provision.

However, service seekers from Kigali indicated that the practice of gift-giving with the purpose of securing preferential treatment diminished significantly after officials introduced the requirement to take a number when awaiting treatment based on the 'first come, first served' principle. It may therefore not come as a surprise that the survey findings inform that when citizens encounter problems with public service providers they assert that 'gift-giving' is the least preferred strategy to employ. Furthermore, gift-giving to public officials is regulated under the Leadership Code of Conduct, which stipulates that a public officer who receives a gift worth more than 50.000RWF must declare it to the Office of the Ombudsman and gifts above 100,000RWF are not allowed as noted by the Deputy Ombudsman of Rwanda during the consultation workshop for the Project held in Kigali.

Finally, FGD participants also discussed the prevalence of bribery in the Rwandan health sector. When it comes to the actual interaction between health service providers and service seekers in the rural district of Gisagara, FGD participants stated that incidences of bribery have diminished to a great extent due to the tightening of anti-corruption law enforcement. In fact, in the rural area, FGD participants did not report incidences of bribery between heath providers and service seekers. However, in Kigali, bribery appears to be more likely to occur than in rural areas as suggested by the urban respondents who discussed in detail the different modalities in which bribery takes place. Nonetheless, even in the urban FGDs, the discussion emphasised that indeed bribery has become more difficult to negotiate and tends to occur only if service seeker and provider know each other. As one participant noted: "corruption has become more and more a private affair due to harsh punishments."

The survey results capture these differences regarding the prevalence of corruption in the health sector, as Figure 1 shows.

Figure 1:   Is corruption prevalent in the health sector in Rwanda? [16]

4.2 Corruption in the Rwanda National Police

According to the Rwanda Governance Board Score Card, the Rwanda National Police (RNP) is one of the most highly regarded and respected institutions [second to the Army] with overwhelming (96.7 %) levels of confidence reported in 2015. Similarly, that same year, the RNP was judged "the most professional of all African police" by the German ambassador.[17]

Nonetheless, the RNP by other accounts continues to be perceived as one of the most corrupt institutions in Rwanda. According to our survey, the perceived prevalence of corruption in the police sector is relatively high as shown in Figure 2 (next page).

Survey results from the rural Gisagara District also reflect negative attitudes toward the RNP, with the highest number of responses (32%) reporting 'low trust' in the police. A common recurring incidence of corruption frequently described by urban service seekers is bribery between drivers and traffic police officers.


Figure 2:   Is corruption prevalent in the police sector in Rwanda?

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[16] The percentages do not add up to 100 per cent as blank statements have been excluded from this presentation.
[17] The German Ambassador to Rwanda, Peter Fahrenholz commended Rwanda for having "one of the most professional police forces on the continent, which is a step towards the country's quest of achieving middle income status..... "I have witnessed high dedication and commitment of Rwanda National Police. I also see a high degree of integrity and honesty among the police officers which is very important," "I have been in many African countries and I believe RNP is the best in Africa. There is no developed country that doesn't have a good police force. There is a clear connection between having development, good governance, good politics and having a good police force; you cannot separate them..." he noted (New Times 2015).

It should be noted that the RNP has put in place several measures to fight corruption within its ranks, including the regular publication of statistics on crimes and offenders, education programmes, and promoting deterrence through internal disciplinary mechanisms, such as the creation of a specialised anti-corruption unit. The zero-tolerance approach is reflected in the number of dismissals, which in 2015 amounted to more than 200 police officers, while 90 officers were dismissed in 2016.[18] According to the police laws even when an officer is not prosecuted in a court of law, they are subject to internal discipline, detention, suspension and even dismissal should their behaviour be suspect (Gatwa 2017).[19]

In spite of these efforts, the RNP administration acknowledges the prevalence of corruption in the Road Traffic, Motor Technical Control and Crime Investigation departments. In this regard, the research data suggests that drivers frequently initiate bribes in order to avoid high formal fines for traffic violations. Currently the fine for speeding amounts to a third of a median salary and several urban FGD respondents share the opinion that the bribes given to avoid traffic offenses could be circumvented by lowering the respective fines. As one male respondent put it: "Do you really think that an amount like 10 or 15 thousand would not make people think? If the penalty was reduced, the government can generate more revenues […], at the same time corruption would be reduced because people would not risk a bigger fine for bribery compared to a relatively small penalty for speeding." Another respondent (a lorry driver), who has frequent encounters with the traffic police, said that "given the size of the penalty – [I] explore all options to pay *akantu* [something] to avoid the heavy penalty." Other accounts suggest that in some instance police officers take advantage of the high costs of the fines to solicit bribes from traffic violators. Overall, this is an interesting point because it shows that excessively high fines may have a counter effect and actually increase the propensity to engage in bribery – even in environments were laws are strictly enforced.

Furthermore, bribing may also occur when driver licences are issued. According to rural respondents, some police officials obtain the bribes collected by driving school managers who act as intermediaries. Nonetheless, bribery during the delivery of licences has diminished remarkably given the harsh punishment and preventive measures that have been put in place, such as the digitisation of services and the creation of a specialised anti-corruption unit within the police force.[20]

4.3 Victims and perpetrators of corruption

Women are the social group most vulnerable to corruption according to FGD participants from both the Gisagara district and Kigali. Women were identified as particularly vulnerable to corruption, because in rural areas men may subject them to 'sexual corruption'. In fact, in rural areas single women appear to be particularly likely to fall victim of corruption by male public officials. These findings are in line with a report of the Ministry of Labour presented to the Parliament, which suggested that 49% of women in search for employment have been subjected to sexual harassment.

Other relevant findings pertain to the attitudes towards denouncing corrupt acts. In the rural FGDs, participants agreed that ordinary citizens do not often venture to denounce a corrupt official out of fear

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[18] The officers, dismissed in 2015 by the Cabinet meeting chaired by President Paul Kagame, were of varying ranks and fired over several charges of misconduct. Those dismissed included one Superintendent of Police, four at the rank of Chief Inspector of Police (CIP); 23 Inspectors of Police (IP), and 38 Assistant Inspectors of Police (AIP). Others are 65 Non-Commissioned Officers and 67 Police Constables (New Times 2017; Igihe 2017).
[19] Interview held on 4 November 2016 with RNP Commissioner head of Ethics Department.
[20] Such measures were well documented by the National Rwanda Police representative attending the consultation workshop that was organised on 27 July 2017 in Kigali to request feedback from local stakeholders regarding the findings of the Project.

of reprisal. In contrast with rural respondents, city dwellers feel more comfortable denouncing corrupt agents. According to FGD participants, this is done by giving information to superiors or resorting to alternative means, such as contacting the media and using social media.

An interesting insight came from the accounts of FGD participants, reporting the emergence of a new phenomenon of intermediaries or 'brokers' in corruption practices. In such instances, a person unknown to a service seeker may reach out by mobile telephone and offer to solve a problem at stake, such as paying a bill or any other matter needing prompt resolution. When the deal is concluded and the money paid through the channel given [for example through mobile phone money transfer], then the service is expedited, without the service seeker ever meeting the 'broker'. This increases the payment of the service seeker as it includes the fee for the 'broker'. Important implications that follow from this new phenomenon is the likelihood that public officers may be involved in such practices, particularly, because the broker is aware of on-going procedures and has the contact details of the service seeker (Gatwa 2017). Furthermore, the emergence of anonymous, impersonal corruption schemes also shows how the threat of detection may have resulted in certain cases to the development of more secretive modalities for engaging in corrupt actions in Rwanda.

5 The role of social networks and the importance of social variables

Social norms and values can be understood as standardised generalisations concerning expected modes of behaviour among community members and therefore represent an important source of guidance on how to act in particular situations. Repeated social interactions and extended exposure to a given social structure leads to certain behavioural patterns becoming internalised and normalised, thereby forming collective social norms and practices (World Bank 2015; Hoff and Stiglitz 2015). In environments where high levels of corruption prevail, practices of petty corruption, including bribery and gift-giving, may therefore be perceived as the norm, and as such, become socially accepted and even prescribed (Lindner 2014; Banuri and Eckel 2012; Jackall 1988; Anders 2002; Anders 2005). In fact, individuals in such contexts may come to consider petty corrupt practices as either the way things are done or even as beneficial if direct personal benefits are derived (cf. Stahl, Kassa, and Baez-Camargo 2017).

In this section, we present the findings associated with the social context and the manner in which accepted norms and values shape behaviours linked to the prevalence of petty corruption in Rwanda. A salient topic that emerges from the research findings links reported experiences with petty corruption to informal social networks, their functional and structural attributes, the social dynamics they reinforce, as well as the costs and tensions they generate.

5.1 Social networks as means to securing preferential treatment

A salient topic in reference to the impact of sociality and social norms on attitudes towards petty corruption is the role played by informal social networks. Any given individual is naturally part of a multiplicity of social networks, beginning with the closest ones comprised by family and friends and extending to networks involving more distant acquaintances, such as school peers, neighbours, fellow church (or mosque) goers and so on. The research findings confirm the insights from the literature review suggesting that social networks are particularly relevant in East Africa as the strong personal connections among members constitute an effective mechanism to pool scarce resources and provide access to goods, services, resources and even career opportunities for those involved (Jauregui, 2014; Ruud, 2000; Chang et.al 2001; Grodeland et al., 1998; Ledeneva, 1997; Sneath, 2002). It is for these reasons that social networks constitute an informal social safety net that helps people cope with resource scarcity and, as such, are highly valued.

In the comparative discussion about the centrality of social networks in East Africa it is important to make a conceptual clarification. Whereas it is clear that individuals belong to multiple, overlapping networks anywhere, the type of networks that are emphasised in this Project are those to which the individual feels bound by obligations that are primordial because they are enforced and sanctioned by stringent social controls. Those networks are the social equivalent to what the political sciences refers to as the leader's 'winning coalition' (Mesquita et al. 2005), meaning those constituencies whose support is most essential for maintaining legitimacy in the case of the political leader, and status and social recognition in the case of the individual. The networks understood in this manner are also interchangeably referred to as cliques, which is the subset of individuals in a wider network in which

actors are more closely and intensely tied to one another,[21] or as reference group (following Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel 2017).

In the case of Rwanda, the research suggests that the family constitutes the most relevant network or reference group and that some of the most important determinants of behaviours are related to the individual obligations associated with kinship ties. People are expected to look after family members, otherwise they may be subjected to shame and blame. The importance of strong family ties is even enshrined in common Rwandan proverbs, such as: *utagira nyirasenge arisenga* [whoever does not have an aunt slips in isolation], *urukwavu rukuze rwonka abana* [the old rabbit is taken care of by its children], *inkoko ivuye mu magi aba amahuri* [when the chicken leaves the eggs they rot] *impyisi y'iwanyu ikurya ikurundarunda* [the wolf from your village –clan– will devour you gently].

While family ties dominated the discussions about sociality, FGD participants also attested to the importance of other types of social networks such as those based on 'mutual self-protection' [*ishyirahamwe rya duhishirane*][22] – which are articulated on the basis of other social criteria such as profession or with a view to resolving particular problems (Gatwa forthcoming 2018). For example, in the Gisagara district, FGD participants described that community saving groups have been organised among the most needy to bear the costs of health insurance for which the payment is usually required at once. The central value ascribed to the social networks suggests that a strong communitarian mind set is prevalent among Rwandans. This insight was confirmed by the survey results that showed that a large percentage of respondents (38%) did not identify at all with a character described as on who "lives life fully autonomously and tries to rely on other people's help as little as possible."

Social networks are especially relevant to the research because they affect the delivery of public services through favouritism, which is linked to the functionality of social networks when it comes to accessing public services. In fact, in the case of health services, discussants agreed that the only way to speed up treatment is precisely through social networks, for instance by appealing to a relative or friend that is either a service provider or has the influence to intercede on the patient's behalf. For example, social networks can be activated to reach out and appeal to influential individuals who can authorise the transfer of a patient from a local clinic to a district reference hospital. Overall, the participants in the FGD in Kigali agreed that health services in urban health centres are expedited for relatives of service providers.

The research captured substantial discussions about the sense of moral obligation to treat family members preferentially among service providers. Pointing to the tensions between work and family responsibilities, one service provider rhetorically asked "[what] else can you do if you don't serve [your] family members?", suggesting that failing to do so throws into question the individual's value in the community. Indeed, the FGD findings point out that if meaningful social ties are present, it is extremely difficult for service providers to withhold a favour. A participant from Kigali explained: "no one can ignore the importance [that] Rwandan people attach to relationships and [there are] consequences associated with not serving the neighbour or one of your family members, even when the situation does not allow [you to do so]." Such consequences were highlighted by a participant in the service providers' FGD from the rural area, who said: "Actually when you refuse to render the service, people to whom you are associated with will say [of you] that 'having him is like not having someone' or 'do not expect any help from…'." The FGD participants further elaborated that a bad reputation can "travel" and as a consequence the service provider involved might lose friends or even garner disdain from extended family members.

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[21] See http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/C11_Cliques.html [25 August 2017].
[22] This kind of social network is what Baez-Camargo and Sambaiga (2015) labelled self-help associations in the case of Tanzania.

As noted by service providers, Rwandan citizens also attach a great deal of importance to other social relationships, including friends and neighbours. Within networks of close friends, participants reported that in instances where a servicer user is a 'friend of the officer', bribes are more likely to occur. The social relationship is used to create a private space where a bribe or informal gift can be negotiated and exchanged away from the eye of the law enforcement authorities and under the cover of the trust vested in the friendship.

Thus, social relationships influence expectations to a significant extent about what constitute appropriate behaviours in different scenarios, sometimes in direct conflict with what the law prescribes. For instance, survey respondents under the age of 30 most often rated that it is 'not corrupt' for a police officer 'to intervene on behalf of a friend who is at fault in a serious traffic accident'. Social networks are also associated with corruption through the pressure they exert on public sector employees to utilise their positions and extract rents or unduly exercise their authority to distribute benefits among the group.[23] In fact, according to FGD respondents, direct family members would not question the source of wealth of a relative who shares with the family and attends to their needs.

From the perspective of users, social networks are used instrumentally, to solve the problems and challenges at hand or, as one research participant put it, to "ease [one's] life." Thus, people resort to their social networks to establish an informal connection with the service provider or decision-maker that can provide assistance. However, service providers can also use their positions to build up their networks in those spheres where service users (of strategic interest to the providers) require some help. Such strategic considerations about building social connections that take place during the interactions at the point of service delivery can be illustrated with the following experience recounted by a FGD participant: "I was aware that I will need to ask him [a patient] to admit my child in his school. Because I had not had any contact [relationship] with him, I took the advantage to let him be treated first although he was not the first one, so that I could prepare the ground. Of course I had to pass through a friend of mine who is close to that headmaster but it was also my responsibility to find a way out of my concern." Therefore, service provision might be affected by the network-building calculations of users and service providers alike.

The instrumentality of social networks also suggests that it is particularly useful to extend one's connections to include powerful individuals. Based on this assessment, district authorities or ranking officers of law enforcement agencies sometimes obtain preferential treatment at public health facilities. While granting such a person preferential treatment might be considered a question of respect for the authority, it may also be facilitated by the desirability of building a personal relationship with the influential individual on the part of the service provider. A service provider who participated in the research recounted how a colleague got in trouble for allowing a person of authority to queue just like everyone else because that was seen as a disrespectful act. Therefore, according to this person's point of view, favouring influential people in the service provision is the reasonable thing to do because it demonstrates respect for hierarchies but also because "this favour towards authority may yield some benefit in the future, you never know!". Similar attitudes were further confirmed by the survey findings where male respondents most often stated that it is 'not corrupt' for a police officer 'to be paid an informal fee to escort the son of a superior during a trip on dangerous roads'.

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[23] In a somewhat surprising result, most often survey respondents were of the opinion that it is 'not corrupt' for a nurse to 'resell stolen medicines in the black market to pay for the wedding of a daughter. While these responses could suggest that family obligations are seen as justifying illicit actions, it has been suggested that the responses have to do with the fact that the Rwandan criminal code does not categorise theft and embezzlement as crimes of corruption. In this view, it is possible that for respondents in the survey, embezzlement is more than corruption; in fact it is a criminal offense punishable by law. More research on how average Rwandan citizens operationalise such terms would be desirable to delve into such a finding.

Social networks are thus effective problem-solving resources for individuals to a large extent because of the collective appraisal, notion and conception that obligations towards the group are binding. This relevance stems from the fact that the social norms of reciprocity that bind networks together are grounded in deeply held values in Rwandan society such as solidarity and duty to the common good. This is mirrored in several traditional proverbs: *ineza yiturwa indi* (generosity is rewarded by another generosity), *akebo kajya iwa mugarura* [a basket of crops goes where it would be reciprocated]. Indeed in the survey, 45% of respondents indicated that they feel a very strong obligation to reciprocate favours received from friends and acquaintances. In this social context, as mentioned above, service providers can be subjected to significant pressure on the part of their social networks while performing their public function. Indeed, evidence form the FGDs suggest that in Rwanda nobody would renounce their social ties and links – especially when there is a sense of 'shared experience and relations'. This often drives them to 'unwillingly or willingly' comply with unwritten rules for reciprocation inherent to a social network – leading to favouritism becoming a socially and culturally reproduced practice grounded on a strong sense of indebtedness based on moral obligation amongst members of a social network.

5.2 Social networks and corruption deterrence

The comparative evidence compiled by the Project across Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda suggests that in the three countries, social network dynamics are conducive to corruption in the form of favouritism, bribery and even embezzlement. However, the more stringent law enforcement environment in the Rwandan case yields important insights into how such factors of sociality adapt under conditions of strict law enforcement; how the tensions between formal and informal practices are resolved; and ultimately how elements characterising the social fabric in East Africa might be harnessed to improve anti-corruption outcomes.

The research findings suggest that in the context of Rwanda, social networks may open doors to access resources and favours but they may also exacerbate risks when a member is caught engaging in corrupt transactions, with potential negative implications for the entire network. Particularly notable in this regard are the policies implemented by the Rwandan authorities that employ a 'naming and shaming' approach whereby not only the identities of individuals accused of corruption crimes are published, but also the names of their parents and communities of origin, thus explicitly making public shaming extensive to the social networks.

Therefore, it is important to note that in addition to spurring corruption, social networks may also curb corruption, for example, by diffusing information about deviant corrupt behaviour or bad service delivery through the social network. When government units' performance is regularly assessed and sanctions for underperformance are credible, then incentives are generated in a ways such that workplace networks can play an important role in promoting mutual monitoring and even peer pressure towards incentivising good performance. Negative appraisals might even lead to dismissal and therefore it has become dangerous to engage in informal practices from the perspective of service providers. In such a context, social network dynamics exert a deterrence effect. This is alluded to in the following observation by a service provider in Kigali; "you see, if I come to work with a temper and then offer a bad service to one person, surprisingly the way I gave the service will be communicated to other people who are linked to that service seeker. The information may [then] be communicated to my boss."

As the previous quote suggests, there is the common perception that bad performance is routinely detected and punished in the Rwandan public sector, which is in turn associated with the various monitoring and evaluation strategies implemented to ensure quality control and deter petty corruption. Policy strategies include the digitisation of services, such as electronic queuing systems that ensure a

first come first served rule and the establishment of quality assurance and customer care units in health facilities that supervise performance and collect patients' feedback on a daily basis.

The research findings also uncovered evidence about the manner in which service providers resolve the tensions between adhering to formal rules governing their duties and the informal norms that make them feel obliged to respond to their social networks. According to FGD participants, in order to cope with such tensions, service providers must find ways to accommodate their network, without directly compromising their formal function as the following statement suggests: "to avoid problems with citizens we find alternative time for a rendezvous with friends so that citizens' service delivery is not disrupted. Friends or relatives can be offered to come towards the end of the day or [in the] early morning. Hence there is no conflict with the order of priority given to any other service seekers. In that way, we keep [our] reputation which has an effect on performance." By doing so, the provider keeps adhering to the official responsibilities during working hours while attending to the needs from social networks in his or her spare time.

Thus, the evidence from Rwanda underscores the strong effect of a strict anti-corruption stance on the part of the government whereby the increased monitoring and heightened risk of punishment noticeably decrease the opportunity space for giving into social pressures and network demands. Meaningfully, in Rwanda, service providers account of the troubles they go through in order to accommodate their duties vis-à-vis the closest circle of family and friends. This provides stark contrast with countries like Uganda, where anti-corruption laws are weakly enforced and the social networks perform a function similar to that of a currency, leading to people instrumentally expanding their networks and recommending "reasonable" service providers across social networks.

6 Mental models: shared ideas and self-fulfilling prophecies

Behavioural studies emphasise the importance of automatic thinking, which is the propensity to make judgments and choices automatically, rather than deliberatively. Decisions may respond then to the presence of *frames*, which refer to the way choices are presented (for example, as a loss or a gain). Automatic thinking can also be associated to *anchors,* which are contextual aspects that have no direct relevance to a decision but that nonetheless affect judgement, leading individuals to jump to conclusions on a very partial view of the problem. Choices may also be made on the basis of *default options,* which comprise the modal patterns of behaviour prevailing in any given social context.

Another key behavioural principle postulates that individuals' decision making is influenced by the mental models prevailing in their culture (World Bank, 2015). Mental models refer to categories and stereotypes that people use to make sense of the world and to shape their views. Mental models are also relevant to the extent that they shape the roles of different societal actors on the basis of what those actors believe is expected of them (ibid.). Shared images and ideas about social roles – including what constitutes being a 'good' politician, service provider and public official – determine how people come to expect themselves and others to behave in different situations (Kotzian, 2011). These collective images legitimise behaviours that may have no correlation with formal roles and legal mandates, thus opening the way for illicit actions to be tacitly tolerated and even accepted.

This section explores the impact of automatic thinking and mental models on the predispositions towards petty corruption in Rwanda.

6.1 Rwandan values and the home grown initiatives

This research reflects broadly on behavioural elements that underpin attitudes towards petty corruption and particularly, on the manner in which cultural traditions – and the collectively held mental models they generate - promote, or have the potential to promote, practices and behaviours that support anti-corruption outcomes or, conversely, whether cultural traditions endorse behaviours that fuel corruption. There are highly relevant lessons to be learned from the Rwandan case in this regard.

FGD participants were asked to reflect on traditional Rwandan values that they recognise and are familiar with. Their responses included: *gusangira* [sharing meals and drinks], *gutabarana* [friendly neighbourly intervention and solidarity in moments of need], *gucumbikira abashyitsi* [hospitality towards strangers]; *gufungurira abashyitsi cyangwa abagenzi* [catering for strangers and travellers]; *guha umubyeyi amata* [giving milk to women who have given birth and have no cow]; *guhemba umubyeyi* [offering presents to families with newborns]; *guheka umubyeyi cyangwa umurway* [transport of sick persons to the hospital]; *gacaca/inyangamugayo gukiza amakimbirane* [conflict resolution by mediators]. Other Rwandan values exalt the desirable virtues like *ubunyangamugayo* [moral integrity] and *ubutwari* [excellence] as opposed to ill practices like *ubugwari* [cowardice].

As the research evidence would indicate, there is a shared familiarity of Rwandan citizens with traditional practices that are intrinsic in values of solidarity and social justice. In this regard, the significance of the Rwandan so-called home-grown solutions (HGSs) stands out. The Home-grown Initiatives (HGIs) refer to state policies and programmes that formalise social practices rooted in Rwandan cultural traditions that promote social welfare and community development by appealing to a

collective sense of responsibility, solidarity and fraternity (Gatwa forthcoming 2018). There are many HGSs that have effectively incorporated traditional values into formal government policy. While discussing them all would go beyond the scope of this report, we discuss three paradigmatic examples of such home-grown solutions, because this policy innovation is extremely relevant to the discussion of behavioural drivers of corruption.

A first example is the aforementioned *Ubudehe* social programme, which involves the categorisation of citizens by income level so as to determine which level of payment is to be made when accessing public services such as health. According to tradition, *Ubudehe* originally refers to community activities that are based on solidarity such as assisting neighbours and the community at large with land cultivation, building houses or tending the pasture for the cattle. As Gatwa (forthcoming 2018) clarifies, the *Ubudehe* activity was particularly instrumental in assisting vulnerable groups, such as widows and elderly to access public services and who otherwise lacked institutional assistance. With the exception of an illness or other well-justified excuse, participation in *Ubudehe* was mandatory for all community members.

Nowadays, *Ubudehe* categorisation effectively confers this role to the state of providing support for the poorest and most vulnerable groups. Formalising *Ubudehe* and incorporating it into concrete policy-making addresses some key behavioural drivers of corruption as *Ubudehe* reduces the reliance of citizens on informal social networks to access public services and social benefits.

A second example is the *Imihigo* performance contracts that promote excellence in service delivery, accountability and a commitment towards the welfare of the society. Traditionally, *Imihigo* referred to the practice whereby community members would define goals to which they would commit individually, reporting through *guhiga ibigwi* [to vow proudness for heroism], and assuming accountability for their achieved performance in public ceremonies in front of their leaders and the entire community. These ceremonies, called *Guhigura Imihigo* or *Kwivuga ibigwi*, entailed a public eulogy of the individuals' bravery or success before the leader (Gatwa and Uwimbabazi 2016).

Today, the government has rehabilitated *Imihigo* as a key public sector performance management instrument. It takes the form of a performance contract for officials at all different levels of the public administration. The contracts are aimed at achieving objectives aligned with the national development plan and include a set of development targets, measured against specific performance indicators, to be achieved over a period of one year. In the pursuit of the realisation of those goals, local government officials engage communities in different activities, whilst the central government commits to provide all necessary financial and technical resources concomitant to the pursuit of the performance targets (Gatwa and Uwimbabazi 2016).

Imihigo has become a highly visible performance-monitoring instrument in Rwanda, which is strongly associated with the effective enforcement of the rule of law and to the success in achieving anti-corruption outcomes. This is further supported by the fact that *Imihigo* allocates significant budgets to Districts and Ministries (part of the decentralised budget) for anti-corruption programmes in support of broader good governance interventions. Service providers in the FGDs repeatedly alluded to the fact that there is strong determination in Rwandan public administration to increase transparency,

performance and accountability – all of which make practices and instances of petty corruption harder to encounter.[24]

Finally, worthy of special attention are the *Itorero* educational programmes promoted by the Rwandan government. In the history of Rwanda, *Itorero* was the school of excellence for the Rwandan youth. These youths were selected and trained at the chiefs and King's palaces and equipped with moral and intellectual skills. Furthermore, military training of the youths was intended to develop virtues of courage, patriotism, endurance, responsibility, social cohesion, tolerance and the rejection of corruption and other depraved values.

Today, *Itorero* recruits across all strata of society and retreats for several days are organised with the aim of reviving traditional values of integrity, creativity and innovation. Consequently, *Itorero* is still regarded as the permanent school for promoting the culture of excellence. It is also the backbone of the *Ndumunyarwanda* philosophy, which strongly emphasises the fight against corruption and the reconstruction of a moral society based on the observance of those values and particularly integrity [*ubunyangamugayo*] (Ndikumana and Niyibizi 2016).

Certainly, not all traditional norms are necessarily conducive to positive social outcomes. FGD participants also recounted shared cultural and social practices that could be conducive to bribery. Those were discussed in relation to certain sayings based on traditions such as: *amatama masa ntasabira inka igisigati* [empty mouths do not request a pasture to cattle]; the *Jyendauzagaruke*: go and come back tomorrow, which is used as a way for Rwandans to kindle a friendship. FGD participants explained that today, some of these are still observable in the expressions used for requesting a bribe such as *gutura* and *gutanga amakoro* [harvest presents to king or chief]; *guhakwa* [service to chief or king in exchange for favours]; although all of these practices are now prohibited by law.

Significant is the manner in which the Rwandan regime has implemented what may be viewed as a behavioural approach to promoting anti-corruption efforts by means of strengthening shared mental models that promote values of integrity, accountability and public duty. To be sure, *Ubudehe, Imihigo* and *Itorero* communicate a strong message about social justice, accountability and integrity as key guiding values that characterise not just the conduct of public affairs, but also the nature of the relationship between citizens and government and, ultimately, Rwandan national identity. Therefore, official policies explicitly articulate and reinforce the development of a culture – or shared mental model – that dictates roles, behaviours and expectations that align with the promotion of good governance outcomes.

This policy approach is especially powerful in that it appeals to social norms and cultural traditions, harnessing them to prime individuals on the importance of adopting behaviours conducive to good governance outcomes and to avoiding other behaviours that are detrimental to society. This behavioural approach is palpable across the country due to the manner in which messages are reinforced via environmental cues, such as publicly displayed codes of conduct and messages reinforcing desirable and undesirable behaviours in pursuit of the public good. As the Literature Review suggested, environmental cues, understood as unspoken signals that trigger certain behaviours, can play a crucial role in either eliciting or inhibiting corrupt behaviours (Peiffer and Rose 2014; Bateson, Nettle, and

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[24] More than half of the annual government's budget is allocated to the Imihigo projects countrywide, particularly at the local government level, where they are elaborated and managed by the corresponding District and Sector authorities. The economic, social and governance sectors account respectively for 50%; 30% and 20% of the allocated budget. Imihigo contracts are signed by heads of public institutions in the Parliament jointly with the President of the Republic and the achievements are systematically evaluated by an independent agency hired by the government; the report is presented to the Parliament by the government under a session jointly chaired by the President of the Republic, the Speaker and President of the Senate. Imihigo contracts undergo internal and semi-public evaluation during the annual top leadership retreat and before the National Dialogue (ibid.).

Roberts 2006). In the Rwandan context, examples of such environmental cues can be found prominently displayed around the country, for instance, at the main gates of public and private institutions or at the roadside on the main road leading to the communities, as shown in the pictures below.

Source: authors' photographs

Left: The photograph of a District office, a deputy mayor in charge of economic affairs, is attached to his door, including his names and mobile and telephone number. Opposite, the major task and duties of the officer are depicted. Underneath, a poster of Transparency International says: 'don't shy from pointing a finger wherever you see corruption: the law protects you; followed with telephones to call to report corruption cases.'

Right: This stone photographed alongside the main Road Kigali-Butare/Huye displays the values of a Cell, Kigembe in the District of Kamonyi, Gacurabwenge Sector. On the left side, listed are the values to be promoted, contrasted with the anti-values to be eradicated. The ten promoted values are: Rwandanness; patriotism; integrity; work ethics and morale; fighting for dignity and self-reliance; cleanliness; courage; work by objectives [known in governance domain here as contract of performance][25].

Interestingly, it was possible to obtain research evidence on how the emphasis on integrity as a central value to guide behaviours and choices has impacted the manner in which Rwandan citizens understand national identity. Overall, FGD participants expressed feelings of great pride for being called Rwandans. Urban participants provided further detailed insights into the extent of priming of values associated with national identity. When asked what 'behaving like a Rwandan' meant to them, they said that being Rwandan is attached to notions of dignity because it gives people credentials. People would nowadays feel proud to be Rwandans: *umunyarwanda ariyubaha* [a Rwandan would cheer up his/her moral values], even a taxi driver would not charge more than is required on a journey; *umunyarwanda afite ishema* [Rwandans are proud of their identity]. The participants added: "But there was a time back where, being or behaving like a Rwandan was hard to bear; or felt like an insult; or a suspicion of accusation!"

Another important point is that, overall, Rwandans not only seem to appreciate the benefits of good service delivery, but have taken great pride in these changes and the resulting improvements in their livelihoods. The majority of participants appreciated the value and benefits of having a well-functioning health care system and a national police that is improving its relations to citizens. Also, according to the research participants, citizens greatly appreciate the weekly 'day of accountability' known as *Umunsi w'ibibazo* [the day for answering the citizens' concerns], during which the government authorities make

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[25] Many different tools of communication are used cross the country by public institutions, Districts, Sectors, Cells, schools, hospitals and clinics and other public and private institutions to display moral values promoting the fight against corruption.

themselves available to respond to any needs of the population. At the same time, research participants recognised that officers who work with probity and integrity are well respected these days because of the campaign for dignity and the rehabilitation of Rwandan values of integrity [*ndiumunyarwanda; agaciro*]. This latter point is extremely important as socially constructed determinants of status and respectability have been proved to be key elements shaping decision-making and promoting and reinforcing distinct behavioural patterns (Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel 2017).

6.2 Perceptions about the prevalence of corruption in Rwanda

In comparison with neighbouring countries, such as Tanzania and Uganda, Rwandan survey respondents account for relatively low levels of petty corruption. Whereas in Uganda and Tanzania respectively 60% and 45% of respondents strongly agree that corruption is inescapable, in Rwanda only 23% of respondents shared that view. Figure 3 provides more details on the perceived prevalence of corruption in Rwanda, including both urban and rural perspectives.


Figure 3:   Is corruption inescapable in Rwanda?

In fact, the research findings strongly confirmed a shared perception among citizens that corruption in the country is not the norm and that engaging in corrupt actions is a highly risky endeavour given the high possibility of being caught and facing severe punishments. In particular, participants were very well aware of the consequences of engaging in acts of corruption, particularly the manner in which those acts are publicly shamed and perpetrators put on display by Rwandan enforcement and anti-corruption entities.

Significantly, FGD participants stated that Rwandan institutions are very efficient in identifying and fighting corrupt practices. High levels of trust in state institutions are also evident in the survey results, observing that 70% of the respondents have 'total trust' in the Office of the President' and cumulatively 64% of the respondents indicate having 'high trust' or 'total trust' in the Office of the Ombudsman. This suggests the effectiveness of the use of media campaigns to raise awareness about prevailing anti-corruption rules as well as the systematic punishment of offences committed. Consequentially, trust in public institutions is quite high in Rwanda, as Figure 4 shows.

These findings strongly support the assessment that control of corruption in Rwanda is facilitated by the presence of particular frames, whereby individual choices and behaviours are affected by perceptions of

generalised patterns of behaviours of others in the shared context. Thus, the prevailing 'narrow frame' seems to be the common belief that people generally avoid corrupt behaviours.[26] Mental models about the state's strong monitoring capabilities and especially its law enforcement agencies reinforce this. These perceptions are also shaped by the stringency of the sanctions that the Rwandan criminal code establishes for cases of corruption and by experiences of real instances where the corruption-detection and investigation efforts of the relevant state agencies have demonstrated success.


Figure 4: Average responses regarding trust in institutions in Rwanda (1 = no trust, 2 = low trust, 3 = indifferent, 4 = high trust and 5 = total trust)

To give an example, there was a time when the police used special money that had been tempered with to track people who were suspected of corruption. From that time onwards, people have become extremely suspicious and apprehensive about accepting something from an 'unknown' person - thinking that such a person may be an undercover officer from the anti-corruption unit. In fact, FGD participants in the group of service providers explicitly argued that one cannot take the risk of accepting a bribe at the workplace as agents from the Office of the Ombudsman might be monitoring.

In another account, an individual was stopped twice over traffic violations and asked for a bribe. In one case, the participant, whose offence [dangerous overtaking] carried a fine of 50,000 RWF, was asked to pay 15,000 to go free. When the proposition was turned down the officer let the individual go without imposing the official penalty. In the second case, the same individual was pulled over for speeding, whereby the officer, after explaining the gravity of the offence and returning the car documents, said: "now you can pay a beer if you want." The individual again declined to pay the bribe and was again let off without being fined. The meaningful lesson from these accounts resides in how the driver evaluated each situation; wondering whether the bribe requests had been a ruse and would have convicted him or her of committing a corruption offense or whether the officials simply forgave the infractions.

The insights provided showcase the importance of non-behavioural incentives (monitoring and punishment) combined with behavioural factors (dissemination of key messages and redefinition of the

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[26] A narrow frame is understood as those references to which the automatic system of the mind resorts to in order to evaluate a situation or that which "automatically comes to mind" WDR (2015, p. 6).

determinants of status and social shaming) and their role in shaping shared mental models. As a result of said interplay, corruption has become a clandestine, hidden and even stigmatised matter in Rwanda.

7 Conclusions

7.1 Behavioural determinants of petty corruption in Rwanda

The research findings confirm the results from international assessments, such as the leading corruption and bribery indices and indicators, that levels of petty corruption are remarkably low in Rwanda. Also, in contrast with the experience in other East African countries, the formal rules and regulations governing the public sector tend to be adequately followed and rights and entitlements are good predictors of actual service delivery experiences among users. These overall positive results are undoubtedly attributable to strong perceptions among users and providers alike that performance-monitoring mechanisms are effective and that detection and punishment of rule breaking is the norm. Therefore, one of the key lessons that stems from the evidence collected from the Rwandan case is the strategic role played by top-down enforcement of anti-corruption measures in promoting systemic change.

Interestingly, in terms of behavioural factors rooted in sociality, in some important dimensions the Rwandan context is not very different from the realities prevailing in neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Tanzania. The similarities are preponderantly associated with the central role of informal social networks in the lives of citizens. Just like in its neighbouring countries, social networks are essential to Rwanda's social fabric because they link individuals and communities through strong bonds based on values of solidarity and reciprocity that underpin shared ideals of social justice. Those social bonds also generate strong feelings of obligation toward the welfare of one's group, which can aggravate risks of petty corruption involving favouritism, bribing and embezzlement.

On the basis of the similar social backgrounds, the Rwandan experience garners invaluable insights by illustrating how strong vertical monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms affect the drivers of corruption associated with sociality. Overall, the conclusion may be drawn that the Rwandan government has put measures in place that significantly compromise or make irrelevant the functionality of social networks as a means to get things done. Furthermore, the research findings suggest that network size is related to functionality, as in Rwanda the relevant reference group is for the most part limited to the family and very close friends, whereas in Uganda (and until recently in Tanzania) cliques tend to be extensive, often consisting of multiple overlapping social networks.

A close look at the evidence provided by the Rwandan case brings out two important attributes about social networks that have implications for the region. Firstly, the functionality of extensive social networks is correlated with the quality of public services. It is difficult to imagine that the reference networks in Rwanda could be as constrained if the quality and accessibility of public services were not safeguarded. In other words, in Rwanda, individuals are usually able to solve their problems and access services without having to resort to informal network mechanisms. Secondly, the essential values and norms that underpin the practices of the networks can actually be harnessed to promote better social outcomes. The research suggests that strongly held values based on notions of reciprocity can take on a different meaning when an individual's (corrupt) action has negative consequences for the group. Reciprocity in this context is transformed into a motivation that keeps people from hurting each other by avoiding illegal actions whereby a culprit in a crime of corruption would bring shame to the family and the community. The same can be said of workplace-based networks where the performance evaluation of the whole unit can be compromised by single acts of deviant individuals. As will be argued

below, those same values and beliefs can be the basis for developing targeted approaches aimed at addressing favouritism.

The ambivalence of gift-giving in Rwanda is also similar to what occurs in neighbouring countries when it takes place in the context of the provision of public services. But in Rwanda several measures, including the digitisation of queuing systems and the obligation to report monetary gifts exceeding a certain amount, have worked to reinforce a decreased instrumentality of gift-giving and network-building. This is an example of how social norms can adapt to an environment characterised by stricter anti-corruption enforcement.

The Rwandan case also demonstrates how automatic thinking and mental models can be influenced through policy. Strong beliefs about the high probability of detection and punishment of corrupt behaviours were palpable across all participants in the study. Such beliefs strongly shape behaviours – as the literature suggests – due to the influence of 'narrow frames'. In Rwanda, a narrow frame is present that reflects the notion that corruption is an uncommon occurrence and severely punished. Mental models that recognise that behaving with integrity leads to publicly rewarded behaviours; whereas contrary actions are conducive to shaming and disgrace, also reinforce such a narrow frame.

The latter highlights the pivotal role of leadership. It is not coincidental that levels of trust towards state actors are high in Rwanda, particularly when it comes to the President. It is meaningful that Rwandans were strongly aware of the zero-tolerance approach to corruption that is observed and expected even from individuals at the highest levels in the political hierarchy, whereas in Uganda research participants frequently made reference to corrupt actions by the top leadership to justify and rationalise their own involvement in corrupt actions. In Rwanda, examples of exemplary punishment can be recounted and public acts to hold top government officials to account are organised on a regular basis. These actions are key in shaping mental models, reinforcing the notion that corruption is not tolerated and underscoring the public value that is given to integrity and good performance.[27]

It is telling that petty corruption in Rwanda, in the forms presented here, takes purportedly place in secrecy that often involves planning on the part of culprits. This can be understood as a consequence of the widespread acknowledgement that engaging in corruption is highly risky and cannot be done in the open. Paradoxically, it appears that the success in combatting corruption has resulted in overall improvements regarding the prevalence of corrupt practices, but as a consequence, the few remaining instances and recurring forms of petty corruption are significantly more difficult to identify and detect.

7.2 Policy implications

The fact that favouritism in the Rwandan health sector continues to be an issue - in spite of strong law enforcement - relates to issues of social status and perceived moral imperatives towards one's reference group. Service providers, who are at the intersection between the formal legal and the informal social normative frameworks, understand and experience first-hand the tensions and the contradictions that emanate from social network demands. In this regard, the fact that favouritism is fuelled by strong expectations about obligation and reciprocity can be harnessed to develop a public education campaign that precisely underscores that by forgoing demands of undue preferential treatment and favouritism, both the provider and the family are better off, thereby ensuring to protect the reputation and ultimately the employment of the family member.

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[27] One well-known example took place in the Ministry of Health, where senior staff were said to be under the protection of the Minister, who was considered 'untouchable', while abusing huge public funds in ordering drugs and other medical equipment. However, the officers were dismissed, prosecuted and the Minister even lost her position.

- *Media "edutainment" campaign that uncovers the hidden costs that favouritism generates and support a culture reinforcing the recognition that public officials cannot use their positions to favour anyone regardless of feelings of solidarity and affection. Stories could be emphasised in which favouritism leads to the guilty provider being shamed and losing his or her job and thereby inflicting greater costs on the family in the long run.*

Gift-giving is another practice that is socially grounded and that becomes particularly problematic when taking place in the context of public service provisions.

- *Campaign educating citizens that it is not necessary to reciprocate a service that a citizen is entitled to receive in the first place. Using a catchy slogan to reinforce the message in the media could be further reinforced by means of physical symbols at the workplace, such as an approach adopted in Serbia where health staff were required to wear pins with the legend "I work for the salary, not for the gift."*

An area of particular concern regards that some service users – especially from the rural FGDs – reported being fearful about retributions from reporting corrupt service providers.

- *Strengthening the anonymity of current complaints mechanisms would be a positive albeit not sufficient step. For example, both Transparency International and the Office of the Ombudsman use suggestion boxes; which could be improved in terms of reinforcing trust in their anonymity, if the hierarchies of the tested institutions were to be the only ones having access keys. The opening process should be made public and transparent and officers suspected of corruption should be instructed to respond publicly.*

High fines for traffic violations came out strongly as generating perhaps unnecessary corruption risks.

- *Consider revisions to the fines associated with traffic violations.*

Another key topic emerging from the research findings and that is reason for grave concern is the apparent prevalence of sexual corruption. The Ombudsman shared these concerns and recognised the high prevalence of such practices and underscored the challenge given by the very low rates of denunciation. Consequently, this problem deserves special attention, particularly because sexual corruption is hardly comparable to other types of corruption. For instance, one key question is whether in cases of sexual corruption the actions of both the bribe taker and the bribe giver should be equally criminalised. Some scholars have made the argument that regardless of whom requests the sexual exchange, only the public official and not the woman should face corruption charges, mainly because the power asymmetry makes any argument about consent questionable. Corruption charges however should proceed when a woman makes a sexual proposal to obtain a favour from a public official and the latter refuses, then the woman is guilty of attempted bribery (Gitlin 2016). If one were to agree with this interpretation, then it would be of utmost importance to raise awareness among male public officials of the implications and consequences of accepting sexual favours from the public, possibly in a light that makes such offenses particularly shameful and costly. This message could be disseminated and reinforced via "edutainment" campaigns where positive role models could be reinforced. Positive role models of socially engaged, empowered women could also be sought out to improve denouncing rates among victims of sexual corruption. A positive experience fighting sexual corruption in the education sector in Cameroon involved enabling female students at the University to bring their grievances about unwanted sexual advances by professors to one of the highly respected Vice-Chancellors, who represented a female role model in a position of influence and power (Little 2014).

- *Raise costs – in terms of criminal sanctions and social shaming - of soliciting or accepting sexual favours on the part of male public officials. Establish safe whistle-blower mechanisms for women to denounce unwanted sexual advances preferably linked to a strong, positive female role model.*

The research on behavioural drivers of corrupt behaviours delivers evidence about the processes and areas that are promising entry points for developing interventions aiming at promoting behavioural change in support of better development outcomes. However, as is also evident from the research, adequate contextualisation of any development intervention is crucial and, in the case of behavioural interventions particularly, since it is extremely difficult to predict which precise approach is going to be most effective at appealing and making sense to the intended beneficiaries. Therefore, practitioners must be prepared to experiment and test different approaches to find those to which the target populations are most responsive.

- *Develop pilot interventions that test different approaches to behavioural interventions by means of rigorous experimental methods such as randomised control trials in order to discover the most effective programme models.*

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